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ABSTRACT 
 
The study of greyfields for this thesis was motivated by the increasing problems of traffic and air 
pollution associated with sprawling development patterns. Typically located in inner ring 
suburban areas, greyfields, or failed retail malls, represent sites that can be redeveloped 
profitably into mixed-use, walkable neighborhoods. Yet, few successful examples of greyfield 
redevelopment exist, especially when compared to the relative proliferation of brownfield 
redevelopment.  
 
Brownfields, or contaminated urban sites, are very costly to remediate and it is surprising that 
this type of redevelopment outpaces greyfield redevelopment on such a significant scale. This 
thesis addresses the disparity between the two redevelopment types and describes differences 
between brownfields and greyfields through application of an economic model for 
redevelopment. The variables of the model are then applied to each redevelopment type and 
considered in the context of several greyfield case studies located on the east coast.  
 
Where the economic model is incomplete in fully explaining the disparity between the 
redevelopment types, factors outside of the model have been considered, including the existence 
of externalities and public subsidies at federal, state and local levels. Lastly, suggestions of how 
to foster increased implementation of greyfield redevelopment and create an industry around the 
reuse of greyfield sites are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The study of greyfields for this thesis was initially motivated by the problems of traffic 
and air pollution associated with sprawling development patterns. The consequences of sprawl 
are not a new topic. Six years ago, a 2000 Pew Center survey found that of all domestic 
concerns, Americans were most troubled about sprawl and traffic – more than crime, jobs, or 
education.1  Sprawl has been defined as an area where residential homes are more than 3 miles 
from daily destinations such as jobs, recreation, and shopping.2  Another way of defining sprawl 
is an area in which land consumption is occurring at a rate faster than population growth.3  Yet, a 
common misconception of sprawl is that population growth is the primary driver of congestion 
and traffic. As shown in the following table, however, land consumption has far outpaced 
population growth, even in areas that declined in population. 
Region Time Frame 
(Years)
Increase in 
Population  (%)
Increase in Land 
Consumption (%)
United States 1974-1984 38% 80%
Puget Sound 1970-1990 38% 87%
Los Angeles 1970-1990 45% 300%
New York City 1970-1994 5% 61%
Cleveland 1970-1990 (decline) 33%
Chicago 1970-1990 4% 35%
Kansas City 1970-1990 29% 110%  
Source: Nozzi, Dom. Road to Ruin: An Introduction to Sprawl and How to Cure It, p. 10. 
This table shows that population growth cannot be the sole driver behind the challenges of 
sprawl, but rather, the primary cause is the disproportionate increase of driving distances 
required to get to the same destinations for work, shopping and recreation. It is the car-based 
transportation system on which we rely that is creating the drastic increase in land consumption, 
per capita oil consumption, and resulting air pollution, traffic and congestion.4   
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Despite these facts, some defend sprawl because of its association with economic 
prosperity, privacy, mobility and choice. According to Robert Bruegmann, a defender of sprawl, 
“the reason these problems occur is that these [places] are so attractive… because they offer 
what people really want more than anything else.”5  Bruegmann goes on to describe privacy as 
the ability to control one’s environment through home and land ownership. A counter-argument 
exists, however, that providing suburbia for everyone means that its benefits ultimately go to no 
one.6  By everyone seeking to have a home surrounded by open space away from the city center 
means that no one gains these things. Instead, seekers of this lifestyle become surrounded by 
congested collector roads with hastily constructed residential subdivisions, suburban business 
parks and retail strip centers. “As soon as the suburban pattern became universal, the virtues it 
first boasted began to disappear.”7
The car-dependent nature of sprawl impacts the lives of many different population 
groups. For example, those too young, too old, or too poor to drive are isolated by car-dependent 
sprawl.8 Other affected population groups include weary commuters and stay-at-home parents 
who spend much of their time chauffeuring children from one place to another. In fact, the 
American stay-at-home parent averages 14 car trips per day.9  
Households and municipalities also incur financial costs of car-based sprawl. For 
example, transportation, including gas, car purchases and maintenance, is one of the highest 
expense categories for American households, comprising 18% of a household’s budget, second 
only to housing at 19%.10 In cities such as Houston, TX, that are even more dependent on the 
car, transportation consumes 22% of an average household’s budget.11 Local municipalities and 
the federal government also bear the financial burden of America’s auto-dependency. These 
municipalities struggle to keep pace with costly infrastructure requirements, such as road 
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improvements and construction of new schools. At the federal level, the government spent $117 
billion on roads and $29 billion on public transportation in 1999. 12 It is interesting to note that it 
is often said that the government invests in highways and roads, but subsidizes transit, when the 
financial transaction is essentially the same – local, state and federal governments are spending 
money to improve transportation. When taking into account all true costs of driving, including 
environmental externalities such as air pollution, costs of defending oil supplies, and other direct 
subsidies, U.S. motorists receive an estimated $700 billion per year in hidden subsidies for 
driving. 13  If these subsidies were passed through directly to gas prices, one gallon of gasoline 
would cost between $6 and $15.14  Thus, it is clear that car-based, sprawling development 
patterns have adversely impacted the environment, the financial health of municipalities, and the 
overall quality of life for many Americans.  
Given the existing challenges and financial costs associated with car-dependent sprawl, it 
is sobering to consider the projected increase in the built environment over the next few decades. 
The United States is in the midst of a building boom and projections anticipate further 
development and construction, with one source predicting a 50% aggregate increase in the built 
environment by 2030. 15  Furthermore, this growth is anticipated to occur primarily in the 
suburban, lower density, autodependent areas of the southern and western United States. 16 While 
some U.S. urban centers are witnessing a resurgence in population growth, it is quite small in 
comparison to suburban growth.17  
Combining the consequences of sprawl with Americans’ continued desire to live in the 
suburbs presents a unique opportunity for underutilized greyfields. Greyfields have been 
traditionally defined as failed retail malls and are often located in older, inner ring suburban 
areas.18  These failed malls were given the name “greyfield” due to the grey color of the single-
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story buildings and the sea of parking lots that surround them. This term parallels “brownfields,” 
the development industry term for contaminated urban sites, and “greenfields,” defined as 
previously undeveloped rural land or open space on the suburban fringe. 
As more people feel the strain of energy costs and traffic, the importance of walkability 
and alternative transportation choices start to appeal more broadly in the market. Redeveloping 
failed greyfields sites in suburban areas into higher-density, walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods 
can improve quality of life by decreasing the length and number of required vehicle trips, 
consequently also reducing air pollution and traffic. The idea is not to eliminate the car, but 
rather reduce our dependency on it by creating communities that can support transportation 
options such as walking, biking or public transit.  In addition, mixed-use greyfield 
redevelopment can create substantial value for the property owner and local municipality through 
better financial performance of the property, increased tax base, greater feasibility of public 
transit, creation of new jobs, and establishing a sense of identity for the community. Rather than 
start over building new suburbs on greenfield sites, it preferable to reuse underutilized, 
previously developed greyfield sites and transform them into something better.  The idea is not to 
stop suburban growth, but at least direct some of the growth into redeveloping greyfield sites. 
Reusing greyfield sites has other advantages as well. First, at one point in time, people 
were accustomed to shopping at that location, in contrast to a greenfield site where a developer 
may be creating a new market from scratch. Additionally, while there has been some gravitation 
towards living in urban centers again, one of the main reasons this trend has yet to capture the 
suburban family is due to stereotypically poor public schools located in urban areas. Suburban 
locations often have much better performing public school systems and thus, while a walkable 
lifestyle may have general appeal, many families cannot afford private education and must 
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choose the strongest public schools for their children. Greyfields have a unique opportunity in 
this case to attract the young family demographic due to their location in the suburbs and 
potential proximity to strong school systems. Greyfield redevelopment could meet a need for an 
underserved population demographic while simultaneously reclaiming underutilized land, 
redeveloping existing structures into more sustainable, mixed-use places, and ultimately 
transforming suburban land use patterns.  
Given the benefits of reusing greyfield sites, examples of greyfield redevelopments were 
studied as part of this thesis. All greyfields studied are located in U.S. states along the east coast 
with each site being either in the planning stage, under construction or substantially complete. 
What first became apparent about this topic was how few examples of this implementation 
actually existed. Merely identifying greyfield redevelopments was a challenge. A search for real 
estate development firms that specialized in greyfield redevelopment revealed that none existed. 
Two of the top urban planning firms espousing greyfield redevelopment were interviewed as 
well. Duany Plater-Zyberk (“DPZ”) and Dover Kohl Partners (“Dover Kohl”) are New Urbanist 
planners that have redesigned suburban greyfields into mixed-use walkable neighborhoods or 
town centers.19  Neither of these firms knew of any real estate developers specializing in 
greyfields nor were they aware of any new greyfield projects.20   
Greyfield specialist, Lee Sobel, with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), 
was also questioned about the location of new greyfield sites or greyfield-focused developers. 
Mr. Sobel indicated that it was quite difficult to identify new greyfield redevelopments and knew 
of less than a handful of new sites, interestingly all “one-off” transactions. This “one-off” nature 
was one of the characteristics that emerged during this study that nearly all greyfield sites shared. 
Whether the developer was a large-scale REIT or a small family-owned firm, no greyfield 
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redevelopments identified involved a “repeat” developer. Lastly, no federal or state databases or 
public resources existed to assist in identifying these redevelopments of greyfield sites.  
 What is interesting about the relative low frequency of both the redevelopments and the 
resources with which to find them is that a significant number of greyfield sites may very well 
exist. A report completed in 2000 by Price Waterhouse Coopers indicated that 7% of all existing 
retail malls were in greyfield status, and an additional 12% of malls would reach greyfield status 
within the next 5 years.21  This translates into somewhere between 50 and 200 greyfield malls in 
the U.S., averaging 45 acres each in size.22  Given this significant number of sites, why have so 
few greyfield sites been redeveloped?  
The lack of greyfield redevelopment is particularly puzzling when compared to the 
relative proliferation of brownfield redevelopment. A mature industry has emerged around 
brownfield redevelopment, including specialists, consultants and technological advances that 
ease the implementation of these redevelopments. Additionally, substantial resources exist at 
federal and state levels in identifying, understanding and assisting in the remediation and 
redevelopment of contaminated brownfields. With the significant costs, risk and liability of 
brownfield site remediation, why has it occurred so much more often than greyfield 
redevelopment? One answer may be purely based on scale, in that the universe of brownfield 
sites is simply much larger than greyfield sites. The U.S. HUD estimated in 1999 that 
approximately 5 million acres of brownfield sites existed.23  This compares with Price 
Waterhouse Coopers’ estimate of 2,200 to 9,000 acres of retail greyfield sites.24 Furthermore, the 
EPA estimates that there may be 450,000 to over 1 million brownfield sites in the U.S., which is 
significantly more than the 50 to 200 estimated greyfield mall sites.25   
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Rather than draw the conclusion of why brownfield redevelopment has outpaced 
greyfield redevelopment based solely on scale, it is helpful to consider greyfields in further 
detail. First, this thesis will define a broader concept of greyfields, which will provide a larger 
universe of sites to study than those contained in the traditional concept of greyfields as failed 
retail malls.  Then, using an economic model for redevelopment, each of the decision-making 
factors that comprise a redevelopment will be analyzed with respect to both brownfield and 
greyfield sites. The redevelopment model and its factors will then be applied to the greyfield case 
studies visited. Wherever the economic model does not fully explain the disparity between 
brownfield and greyfield redevelopment, other factors such as externalities and public subsidies 
will be considered in relationship to implementation. Lastly, this thesis will evaluate steps that 
can be taken to foster increased greyfield redevelopment.  
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CHAPTER II. GREYFIELDS REDEFINED 
 
As previously mentioned, greyfields have been traditionally defined as failed retail malls, 
typically ranging in size from 10 acres to more than 100 acres.1 For a retail mall to reach “failed” 
or greyfield status, the mall will likely have at least 15% vacancy with sales per square foot 
averaging less than 50% of what a successful mall would earn on a per square foot basis.2 Many 
greyfield malls earn less than $120 per square foot, whereas a successful mall can earn upwards 
of $300 per square foot.3 Additionally, most malls in greyfield status were originally constructed 
in the 1960s and have not been renovated for at least 7-8 years.4  
 
Failed Regency Mall in Augusta, GA 
Source: www.deadmalls.com   
The time period in which greyfield malls were originally constructed is related to the 
pattern of suburban growth. Most greyfield malls are located in older, inner ring suburban areas, 
which declined as newer and nicer suburbs were built on the outskirts.5 These older malls were 
unable to compete with the new and expanded malls and subsequently lost market share, key 
tenants and ultimately declined with a lack of owner investment in the property.6  
In addition to this definition of greyfields, a group of New Urbanist planners has recently 
coined the term “suburban retrofitting.” The idea behind this concept is to retrofit any failed, 
outdated or substantially underperforming single-use suburban parcel, including business parks 
or garden apartment complexes.7 Similar to failed greyfield malls, these sites are often located in 
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older, inner ring suburban areas that have lost their competitive edge to new suburbs and are 
subsequently falling into decay. Retrofitting, meaning literally to “to substitute new or 
modernized parts or systems for older equipment,” is appropriate because most of these 
redevelopment proposals include creating mixed-use buildings and intermodal transportation 
options, such as walking, biking and transit.8  
   
Proposed suburban retrofit in Tysons Corner, VA. Includes a declining apartment complex and failed retail mall.  
Source: Amy Merritt  
It is logical to include the concept of suburban retrofitting within the greyfield 
terminology because many of these sites share similar characteristics. First, the scale of the 
parcels can be comparable, as apartment complexes, business parks and retail malls typically 
occupy at least 10 acres of land. Second, in accordance with Euclidean zoning, each of these 
places is primarily single-use, comprised of only office, retail or residential uses. Third, these 
sites were constructed in the post-World War II era, coinciding with the rapid rise in car use. 
Thus, the sites are often located near major thoroughfares or at key intersections and include 
substantial amounts of parking, often far more acres of parking than acreage actually occupied 
by buildings. Fourth, these sites are all typically occupied by many tenants under various lease 
structures, with apartment complexes often having highest number of tenants with the shortest-
term leases. Lastly, while these parcels may be leased to many tenants, they are almost always 
14 
owned by a single entity. Thus, the term greyfield and its associated color can apply to all three 
land uses, including residential, office and retail. 
Considering suburban retrofitting within a broader definition of greyfields is also 
appropriate in the context of the redevelopment scheme. In both greyfield redevelopment and 
suburban retrofitting, redevelopment is most often described and implemented in the form of 
mixed-use, walkable neighborhoods. The idea behind each concept is the same – to transform a 
substantially single-use land parcel with many acres of parking into a non-autodependent, mixed-
use place.  Broadening the concept of greyfields further still, the most defining characteristics of 
greyfields are the large seas of parking lots surrounding existing buildings and the fact that the 
property is underperforming the market. Given these two key criteria, there is no reason that 
greyfields cannot also include multi-use sites (uses mixed horizontally) or even mixed-use sites 
where uses are mixed vertically. The latter integration of uses is less likely to be found in 
greyfield sites, however, due to the fact that mixed-use places tend to be more compact and 
walkable and thus, would lack the prototypical large swaths of parking lots.  
In terms of location and size, greyfields can be urban or suburban and range in size from 
very small sites (1 acre or less) to parcels of 300 acres or more.  A greyfield site may have been 
constructed in the 1960s and declined as newer suburbs were built, but a greyfield site may also 
have been constructed more recently and declined for a variety of other factors – changing 
demographics, poor design, or shifting consumer preferences.  This broad definition of greyfields 
could even include decommissioned airports or underutilized military bases in addition to the 
sites previously described.9
An example of a typology that would be excluded from this definition is a suburban 
single family home. While the home may be outdated or even vacant, a home would not have a 
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parking area that exceeded the building footprint. A new definition of greyfields, therefore, 
would be any previously developed property that is not contaminated (i.e. not a brownfield), 
contains more square feet of parking than building area, and is performing poorly. A greyfield is 
a place in which people were accustomed to working, shopping or living at one point in 
relatively recent history (within the last 40 years), yet has ceased to perform successfully as its 
originally intended use. Many of the same characteristics of suburban retrofits and traditional 
greyfields would likely be found in this new broader definition, including occupancy by one or 
more tenants, single entity ownership, and location near key intersections or major thoroughfares 
due to car dependency. The following table summarizes the characteristics of the more broadly 
defined greyfields:  
Key Characteristics 1) More land area occupied by parking lots than by building footprints
2) Property is underperforming the market 
Location Suburban or urban
Size Any size
Land usage Single use, multi-use or mixed-use
Existing structures Single or multi-story buildings
Transportation Access Located at key intersections or along major thoroughfares
Tenancy Encumbered by one or more leases with various term lengths and structures
Occupancy Typically at least 10-15% vacant 
Ownership Often owned by single entity 
Greyfields Redefined
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CHAPTER III. ECONOMIC MODEL FOR REDEVELOPMENT  
To understand the factors driving a greyfield or brownfield redevelopment, a simple 
economic model is helpful in establishing a framework from which to evaluate these factors. 
First, beginning with greenfield development, the decision to develop previously undeveloped 
land can be derived from a basic NPV analysis:  
NPV0 – x > 0 where NPV0 represents the new land value if the proposed program 
is developed and x represents the current market value of the land.1   
The new land value if the proposed program is developed can be determined by measuring the 
difference between the value of the improvements less its costs:  
NPV0 = V0 – K0 where V0 represents the expected value of the program 
improvements and K0 represents construction costs.  
Thus, to develop a greenfield site, the present value of the program’s improvements, V0, less the 
program’s construction costs, K0, and the current market value of the land, x, must be greater 
than or equal to zero to proceed with the proposed development. Shown in equation form: 
  V0 – K0 – x > 0. 
Using this basic decision-making tool for greenfield development, brownfield and 
greyfield redevelopment can be analyzed in a similar way. However, two fundamental issues 
differentiate brownfield and greyfield redevelopment from previously undeveloped land:   
(1) Both greyfield and brownfield redevelopments incur extra development 
costs in the form of demolition expenses and/or site remediation costs.  
(2) A proposed redevelopment is competing directly with the current value of 
the existing structures on that parcel.2  
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These two factors present unique challenges to greyfield and brownfield redevelopment. A 
redevelopment equation incorporating these factors can be shown as follows:  
New land value > Old land value + value of existing buildings + demolition 
costs 3  
Rephrased another way:  
Lnew > Lold + Vold + D0 where Lnew represents the land value under the 
redevelopment proposal, Lold represents the old land value, Vold represents the 
value of the existing buildings, and D0 represents demolition costs. 
This equation can be further modified using the previous variables from the greenfield 
development NPV formula. Remembering that NPV0 also represents the new land value under 
the proposed development scheme, the following substitution can be made: 
Lnew = NPV0 = V0 – K0 – D0 > Lold + Vold 4  
For redevelopment to occur, the new land value, derived from the value of the improvements less 
construction and demolition costs, must exceed the combination of the previous land value and 
value of existing buildings. Phrased another way, the net present value of the new program, after 
paying for construction, demolition and site remediation costs, must be greater than or equal to 
the present value of the current income generated by the existing asset. 
In addition to considering these redevelopment factors, the likelihood of the new proposal 
receiving necessary entitlements in the permitting process must also be taken into account. The 
use of this probability factor suggests two scenarios, each with its appropriately weighted 
likelihood of occurrence. The previous decision-making formula for redevelopment can thus be 
rewritten to incorporate entitlement risk as follows:  
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α (V0 – K0 – D0) + (1-α)*( Lold + Vold) > Lold + Vold where α denotes a probability 
between 0 and 1 and represents the likelihood that a proposal will receive 
necessary entitlements.5  
Simply rephrased, the above equation describes the following conditions which must be true in 
order to proceed with a redevelopment: 
The weighted value of the redevelopment proposal if approved + the 
weighted value of the existing assets if redevelopment proposal is rejected > 
value of the existing asset (i.e. the developer does nothing). 
The use of the probability of entitlements approval, α, is important in measuring which of 
several uses will have the easiest ability to obtain approvals. Any feasibility analysis for a 
redevelopment proposal must evaluate the likelihood of receiving necessary permits and 
approvals. When considering various options, some plans will naturally be more likely to obtain 
regulatory approval than others, and this can vary greatly by geographic area. For example, some 
cities and municipalities have recently taken initiative in rewriting zoning regulations or 
instituting form-based codes to foster mixed-use development and other smart growth patterns. 
In this type of municipality, a plan incorporating these characteristics would naturally have a 
higher probability of approval than a traditional suburban subdivision or standard commercial 
strip center.  In other areas where this type of regulatory reform has not occurred, however, 
achieving approval on a mixed-use, New Urbanist redevelopment proposal of a failing retail site, 
for example, might be quite risky with a low probability of success— its α in the above equation 
may be closer to zero. Conversely, a developer in this same municipality who simply wants to re-
skin the façades of the existing buildings and perhaps add a new retail pad in the parking lot may 
have a much greater probability of success and its α would be closer to 1. Alpha drives the 
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expected value of the left-hand side of the redevelopment equation and thus, understanding an 
area’s regulatory climate and proposing plans that approximate existing guidelines become very 
important.  
Alpha, α, also relates to highest and best use analysis as certain uses might outbid 
alternate uses for the land if the likelihood of entitlement creates a higher land residual. As part 
of determining a site’s highest and best use in the context of entitlement risk, density becomes an 
influential development characteristic.  Density, driven in part by market demand and 
construction feasibility, can significantly impact the probability of receiving permit approvals 
and the proposal’s ultimate land residual. For example, while a 10-story residential condominium 
tower may be feasible in terms of market demand for housing, a low density neighborhood may 
be extremely adverse to this level of density. Consequently, the α for this proposal would be low 
and would reduce the value of the left-hand side of the equation. A proposal for a development 
of single family homes on this site, however, may have a high probability of approval and its α, 
being close to 1, would produce a greater value on the left-hand side of the equation, thereby 
outbidding the condominium use for the land. Thus, the relationship of density to entitlement risk 
becomes clear through highest and best use analyses using the redevelopment equation.  
This complete redevelopment equation, incorporating various factors such as entitlement 
risk, construction costs, demolition and/or site remediation costs, value of existing structures and 
land residual, ultimately illustrates the concept of “land-use succession.”6 In land use succession, 
land use changes due to a positive NPV opportunity to redevelop the existing program into 
another use. In studying greyfields and brownfields, land use succession and highest and best use 
analyses are interesting because these types of sites will likely undergo a change in use if 
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redeveloped. The following section addresses each of the factors of the redevelopment equation 
as they relate specifically to greyfields and brownfields.  
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5 The use of α to denote the probability of receiving necessary entitlements is sourced from the economic model for 
redevelopment proposed by Professor Lynn Fisher.  
6 DiPasquale, Denise and Wheaton, William. Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets, p. 87. 
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CHAPTER IV. REDEVELOPMENT MODEL APPLIED 
The value of the redevelopment model is in understanding how each of the factors of the 
equation applies to greyfield and brownfield redevelopment and how these factors serve to 
differentiate the redevelopment typologies. As previously described, the model for 
redevelopment is as follows:  
α (V0 – K0 – D0) + (1-α)*( Lold + Vold) > Lold + Vold  
Each factor of this equation impacts both greyfield and brownfield redevelopment decisions. 
Since brownfield redevelopment has occurred on a much more frequent basis than greyfield 
redevelopment, it would seem logical that the factors of the redevelopment equation might 
explain why this is occurring. Should the equation’s factors not present a clear rationale 
explaining the low frequency of greyfield redevelopment, then it is possible that there may be 
other factors outside of the equation that are contributing, at least in part, to the greater frequency 
of brownfield redevelopment over greyfield redevelopment.  
Beginning with the redevelopment model, the left-hand side of the equation represents 
the value of the new program, weighted in accordance with its likelihood of receiving 
entitlements. The first parentheses on the left-hand side of the equation, (V0 – K0 – D0), include 
various components of the redevelopment decision-making process. For example, V0, 
representing the expected value of the completed improvements, takes into account market risk 
for each product type in projecting expected rents. Similarly, K0 incorporates risks associated 
with construction costs, including materials shortages and labor risk, and may also reflect interest 
rate risk in financing costs. Since both greyfield and brownfield redevelopments are subject to 
market risk and construction risk, neither of these variables uniquely affects one redevelopment 
type more than the other.  
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However, in determining the expected value of the completed program, V0, the potential 
impact of historical stigma on expected rents must be taken into account. For example, 
brownfields typically have been sitting vacant, abandoned or underutilized for quite some time, 
even decades perhaps. Nearby residents are likely aware of the presence of physical 
contaminants and the brownfield has probably been an eyesore in the community. This stigma 
may very well affect a redevelopment proposal’s achievable rents. Similarly, as a declining 
commercial center or residential complex, a greyfield may also be an eyesore in the community. 
While the site may not have physical contaminants, the demographic composition of the area 
may have changed during the site’s economic decline and structural deterioration. Consequently, 
a greyfield site may have connotations of economic blight, low income demographic and even 
racial implications.1 Both sites, therefore, have stigmas to overcome in attracting people to the 
redevelopment, which ultimately drives the program’s expected value.  
Between the two kinds of stigmas, however, brownfield stigmas may be easier to 
overcome than greyfield stigmas. For example, due to the proliferation of brownfield 
redevelopment, advanced science has developed new technologies to remediate, test and prove 
that soils are free from contamination. Thus, for potential new residents or commercial tenants, 
the perception of a brownfield site as contaminated or harmful can be reversed through provable, 
tangible and scientific means. Furthermore, in many cases, a brownfield site may have been 
contaminated several decades ago, with few people having any memory of what originally 
existed on the site. Greyfields, however, have likely declined within more recent history and 
surrounding neighborhoods may be very aware of the property’s demise. Additionally, the 
stigmas that these sites must overcome are economic or social. These negative economic or 
social associations cannot be removed with a scientific technology or material method. Rather, 
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the transformation must be achieved through a shift in human perceptions, which can be quite 
difficult and slow. Thus, while stigmas and their effects will vary from one location to another, it 
is arguable that greyfields generally have more challenging, intangible stigmas to overcome.  
The value of the third variable in the parentheses on the left-hand side of the equation, 
D0, representing demolition costs, can vary greatly by site and project type. A typical greyfield, 
for example, may have several low-density buildings surrounded by asphalt parking areas that 
will require demolition prior to redevelopment. Brownfields, on the other hand, could have 
substantially different levels of demolition required. Some contaminated sites may no longer 
have any structures above ground and merely be a vacant parcel of land. Demolition costs in this 
case would be minimal. However, other brownfield locations may have multi-story factories or 
large manufacturing plants depending on their historical uses, and demolition costs in these cases 
could be substantial. 
Other factors specific to greyfield redevelopment are imbedded in the D0 variable, 
including costs associated with consolidating or buying out existing leases and re-tenanting 
leased space. The cost of breaking existing leases could be quite expensive depending on the 
type, size and use of the greyfield site. Furthermore, re-tenanting costs of the new program could 
also be considerable and would vary based on the new program’s design. Additional brownfield 
redevelopment factors are included in the D0 variable as well, such as site remediation costs. 
While some level of site remediation is required for all brownfield redevelopment, the amount of 
cleanup required can vary by the proposed uses of the new program.2 Specifically, remediation 
required for a future industrial use may be less than the cleanup required for prospective 
residential uses. All levels of this site remediation, however, would be captured in the D0 
variable.  
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It is generally accepted that brownfields have substantial site remediation costs and, in 
fact, EPA-designated Superfund sites can cost $35-50 million per site and take as long as 10 
years to remediate.3  In spite of these costs, however, several means of reducing these costs and 
mitigating the risk of site remediation have emerged with the proliferation of brownfield 
redevelopment. Federal programs such as the EPA Brownfields Program, environmental 
insurance and brownfield specialists have all served to simplify the site remediation process and 
mitigate the risk of redeveloping contaminated sites. Thus, while remediation costs can be very 
expensive, the risks and costs of this remediation can be at least somewhat offset by industry 
specialists and other resources. 
Continuing with analysis of the left-hand side of the redevelopment equation, the 
probability of a proposal receiving necessary entitlements, α, affects both greyfield and 
brownfield redevelopment feasibility. While both of these sites are likely eyesores in their local 
communities and it is likely that these communities would prefer to see redevelopment occur, 
zoning regulations and neighborhood concerns vary so much from one locale to another that it is 
difficult to make any broad generalizations about whether brownfields or greyfields are more 
impacted by entitlement risk. However, since density is one of the primary drivers of value in a 
redevelopment proposal, greyfield or brownfield sites that are located in municipalities likely to 
accept density may have higher alphas than proposals in lower density areas. This issue of 
density hints at the potential for the locational tendencies of greyfields versus brownfields to 
have some impact on overall redevelopment feasibility. Specifically, if greyfields are usually in 
urban fringe or suburban locations with brownfields typically located in urban areas, then the 
tendency of higher density development in urban areas could contribute to the probability of 
receiving entitlements and to overall redevelopment feasibility.  
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In addition to α and entitlements risk, the question of density and location also relates to 
the new land value, (V0 – K0 – D0), on the left-hand side of the redevelopment equation, which 
reflects the value of the new asset. If brownfield sites are located much closer to interior urban 
areas with greyfields located on the urban fringe or in other suburban areas, then the land value 
generated by a redeveloped, higher density asset may be greater as more density can be 
supported than the density that currently exists on the site. More specifically, as land becomes 
more valuable in the interior areas of a city, developers substitute away from land usage to 
structural capital. 4 With land being more expensive, a developer chooses to use less land and 
more structural capital, and the more intensive use of the land further increases its value. Again, 
relating to the previous section, one hypothesis about the relatively low frequency of greyfield 
redevelopment is that the values of greyfield locations in suburban areas or on the urban fringe 
have not risen sufficiently to create market support for the kind of density needed to achieve a 
positive redevelopment value. Conversely, brownfields that are potentially located in urban 
centers would have substantial market value driven by high density surroundings.  
To test the relative location of brownfields to greyfields within and around a city, a 
simple mapping exercise was completed for the greater Boston metro area.5 First, to determine 
where brownfields were located, a comprehensive list of 21E Waste Sites was obtained from the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (“Mass DEP”). The database of 21E 
Waste Sites from Mass DEP includes any site that contains contaminants, such as oil or other 
toxins, which qualifies them as potential brownfields.6 Potential greyfield sites were identified 
by analyzing a dataset of all retailers in the Boston metro area and applying a credit score filter to 
highlight underperforming clusters of retail.7 Any clusters of at least seven (7) retailers with an 
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average credit score of less than seventy (70) were hypothesized to be potential greyfields.8 The 
following map shows the relationship of these retail clusters to the 21E Waste Sites: 
 
This map shows that the location of potential brownfield sites is not so different from the 
location of potential greyfield sites and in fact, these sites seem to be in fairly similar 
concentrations around the city. Thus, if densification is a necessary characteristic for a 
redevelopment proposal to achieve a positive NPV result, location alone would not be the 
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primary reason that greyfield redevelopments lags brownfields because these two kinds of sites 
are located in very similar patterns around Boston.9  
Shifting to the right-hand side of the equation, the value of existing structural capital, 
Vold, affects a redevelopment decision as rental income generated by the current asset is one of 
the key barriers to overcome in identifying positive NPV redevelopment opportunities. Creating 
a redevelopment proposal that is at least equal to or greater than these rents, taking into 
consideration the risk, timeline to completion and other factors of such redevelopment, is a 
significant challenge for developers.  This is particularly challenging with greyfield sites as the 
current asset is likely producing some positive cashflow for the owner. With brownfields, 
however, it is unlikely that the original asset is producing income as the presence of 
contaminants may make the site unusable. Furthermore, many contaminated sites have simply 
been abandoned with any existing structures demolished. Thus, the value of existing structural 
capital, Vold, for brownfields may be close to zero, whereas reasonable income could still be 
generated by greyfield sites. This discrepancy may support the evidence of fewer greyfield 
redevelopments than brownfield redevelopments. 
 The following table summarizes the factors of the redevelopment equation and which 
redevelopment type is most affected by each factor:  
Factor Greyfield / Brownfield Affected Factor Greyfield / Brownfield Affected
V0 Both affected, but Greyfield stigma more difficult to 
overcome
Lold Varies by individual location, Urban location may benefit 
brownfields with density
K0 Both affected Vold Greyfields more affected by value of existing asset
D0 Brownfields more affected by site remediation costs
α Both affected, but varies by individual location
α (V0 – K0 – D0) + (1-α)*( Lold + Vold) > Lold + Vold
Factors of Redevelopment Equation
Value of Existing Asset (Right-hand side)Value of Proposed Program (Left-hand side) 
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This table shows that while market stigma and the value of existing assets may adversely impact 
greyfield redevelopment feasibility, potential brownfield redevelopments are affected negatively 
by extensive site remediation costs. The remaining redevelopment factors either vary too much 
by individual location characteristics or affect both brownfield and greyfield redevelopments and 
thus, conclusions about which type is most affected by these remaining variables cannot be 
drawn. Thus, it becomes an empirical question as to which factor, market stigma (V0), site 
remediation costs (D0), or the value of the existing asset (Vold), most outweighs the other in 
affecting redevelopment efforts. While the model may be inconclusive in that it cannot explain 
alone which factor is ultimately most important, we can assume that the barriers of market 
stigma and value of existing assets must outweigh site remediation costs since brownfield 
redevelopments are so much more numerous than greyfield redevelopments. Yet, the model does 
not seem to fully explain the disparity between these two redevelopment types and thus, it is 
likely that there are other factors outside of the redevelopment model that contribute to this 
disparity.  
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CHAPTER IV ENDNOTES 
 
                                                          
1 Conversation with anonymous greyfield developer, 7/11/06. 
2 Brooks, Cynthia. Greenfield Environmental Trust Group Inc. Brownfields Redevelopment Presentation 6/26/06. 
3 Ibid.  
4 DiPasquale, Denise and Wheaton, William. Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets, p. 61. 
5 The Boston metro area used in this study includes towns that surround the city of Boston, but excludes Boston 
proper, and was defined by the MIT Center for Real Estate. 
6 The list of 21E sites may overstate the actual number of brownfields as the list does not differentiate between a 
vacant brownfield site with redevelopment potential, versus other contaminated sites, such as a heating oil leak at a 
residential home or an oil tanker spill on a highway.  
7 The original retail dataset was provided by Thacher Tiffany, who assisted in developing a way to identify clusters 
of retailers. Specifically, any retail stores located within one (1) foot of each other were considered to be in a cluster.  
8 Clusters of retail that included at least 7 stores were then filtered by their aggregate average credit score, 
highlighting those with an average score of less than 70. Off the eleven (11) retail clusters identified from this data 
analysis, it is estimated that at least half of these would fit within the new definition of greyfields presented in this 
thesis, including being surrounded by broad swaths of parking lots. 
9 It is acknowledged that Boston has developed historically in a unique way and this may limit the applicability of 
this analysis to other parts of the country. Specifically, Boston metro originally developed as a series of mill towns, 
each of which had an industrial presence. The location of brownfields in suburban areas could be partially due to 
this scattered pattern of town development, whereas areas of the country that developed with true residential suburbs 
around metropolitan centers may lack the industrial past that some of these Boston towns have had. Consequently, in 
these areas, the locations of brownfields and greyfields may not map as closely as they do in Boston and the ability 
to increase the density of a site would partly explain why brownfield redevelopment has outpaced greyfield 
redevelopment.  
32 
CHAPTER V. GREYFIELD CASE STUDIES 
To gain a better understanding of what greyfield redevelopment looks like and the kinds 
of challenges it faces in various stages of the redevelopment process, I felt it would be helpful to 
visit several examples of redeveloped greyfield sites. Consistent with the conclusions of the 
redevelopment analysis above, these greyfield redevelopments exhibited some of the same 
characteristics or overcame similar challenges as those identified in the analysis. All greyfield 
redevelopments studied for this thesis were located in U.S. states along the east coast and 
exhibited land use succession. Specifically, rather than study a simple “mall-over” 1 whereby a 
retail mall’s façade is upgraded or other straightforward makeovers of commercial and 
residential structures, examples of greyfield redevelopment that involve substantial changes in 
land use are more likely to include the complexity of costs and benefits contained in the 
redevelopment model. These multifaceted redevelopments offer richer examples of the factors 
that go into the decision-making process and ultimately have the potential to truly transform a 
site and the surrounding area. The following table lists the greyfield sites visited and studied for 
the purpose of this thesis:   
Name Location Former Use Current Stage Proposed / Existing Uses
Downtown Kendall Kendall, FL Retail mall Under construction Mixed-use mini-city
Mizner Park Boca Raton, FL Retail mall Complete Mixed-use arts & cultural center
Eastgate Town Center Brainerd, TN Retail mall Partially complete Mixed-use town center
Metropolitan Midtown Charlotte, NC Retail mall Under construction Mixed-use urban neighborhood
Project Name TBD Tysons Corner, VA Grocery-anchored retail, 
Garden apartments
Planning, Permitting Mixed-use urban neighborhood
Market Commons Arlington, VA Warehouse, other 
commercial buildings
Complete Mixed-use neighborhood
Project Name TBD Richmond, VA Retail mall Planning, Permitting Multi-use program
Mashpee Commons Mashpee, MA Retail strip center Partially complete Mixed-use village
Greyfield Sites
 
 Each of the greyfield redevelopments visited had particular difficulty with at least one of 
the redevelopment factors described previously, including cost overruns due to project 
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complexity (K0), market challenges such as absorption and poor demographic conditions (V0), or 
delayed regulatory approval (α). For example, in Kendall, FL, just south of Miami, a 350-acre 
transit-oriented redevelopment of an existing mall and adjacent parcels encountered resistance to 
densification from the nearby affluent Coral Gables neighborhood. As a result, the height limits 
of some of the buildings were restricted.2  A reduction in density reduces the overall value of 
completed improvements, V0. The project also incurred significant cost overruns, K0, due to 
unexpectedly hitting water during construction of the 2-story underground parking decks.3 The 
12-month delay caused by this construction challenge had a ripple effect through the timing of 
completion for the mixed-use town center buildings and remaining master plan implementation. 
Delays such as these can be difficult to quantify in terms of additional financing costs incurred or 
a strong residential condominium market that may be missed, but they are representative of 
general redevelopment challenges which greatly impact a project’s ability to achieve a positive 
NPV in the redevelopment model.  
   
The new Downtown Kendall under construction          Rendering of same street with completed improvements 
Mixed-use buildings with underground parking shown   Source: www.downtowndadeland.com
Source: Amy Merritt          
 Similar to the Downtown Kendall project, the Eastgate Mall in Brainerd, TN, and 
Mashpee Commons in Mashpee, MA, are two more examples of greyfield sites that involve 
mixed-use redevelopment proposals replacing formerly single-use retail sites. The Eastgate Mall 
redevelopment project began in 1998 and Mashpee Commons began in 1986. Despite how many 
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years have since passed, neither redevelopment has begun constructing the residential portion of 
the program due to poor market conditions for housing in the immediate area. Both malls have 
been “turned inside out” to gain the aesthetic of true town centers, but neither has been able to 
implement its housing strategy due to the residential market simply not being there. Apparently, 
these sites have not overcome their perception as retail-only destinations to warrant construction 
of residential housing. The lack of demand for residential housing in both of these 
redevelopments may be partly due to the location of these sites. Whereas the downtown Kendall 
project is in close proximity to Miami, FL, Mashpee Commons is not located near any major 
metropolitan area, with Boston, MA, being more than 60 miles away. The Eastgate Mall project 
in Brainerd, TN, is, however, less than 10 miles from Chattanooga, TN, which is considered a 
metropolitan city. Yet, Chattanooga is just the 4th largest city in Tennessee with a population of 
only 155,000.4 This may suggest that proximity to a major metropolitan area is necessary to 
support a mixed-use concept with a significant residential housing component. 
   
Eastgate Mall under construction, 1998          Mashpee Commons retail 
Source: Dover Kohl Partners           Source: Amy Merritt 
Both malls have the appearance of town centers as they have been “turned inside out,” but neither project has been 
able to move forward with its planned residential housing component.  
 
Further complicating the housing strategy for Mashpee Commons, its redevelopment 
program includes an affordable housing component under Chapter 40B. This regulatory 
legislation has been ongoing for several years and is still pending approval. Eastgate Mall has 
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also suffered further housing complications as its new commercial tenants following initial 
redevelopment of the mall in 1998 demanded more parking than the original master plan had 
intended.5 Thus, much of the original surface parking lots that were intended to contain housing 
structures will not be able to be redeveloped as planned unless costly structured parking is built. 
All of these factors, combined with the lack of major metropolitan area located nearby, have 
likely contributed to the faltering implementation of the residential housing strategy.  
 Other greyfield redevelopments have struggled with market stigmas, affecting the V0 
variable in the redevelopment model in terms of rents that can be achieved in the market. For 
example, a regional mall located on the outskirts of Richmond, VA, has recently been purchased 
by a regional developer hoping to construct a multi-use project on the site.6 However, impacting 
the feasibility for various product types, including housing, is the area’s stigma as being crime-
ridden and surrounded by a low income demographic. Similarly, a greyfield redevelopment in 
Tysons Corner, VA, also has a challenging market stigma to overcome. Tysons Corner, located 
in Fairfax County, one of the most congested suburbs of Washington DC, is known for “its 
suburban sprawl, traffic and hodgepodge of development that grew out of poor planning 30 years 
ago.”7 A 40-acre failed grocery-anchored retail center and underperforming garden apartment 
complex are in the planning and feasibility stages for redevelopment, with a mixed-use, higher 
density plan, including buildings of more than 10 stories, being contemplated. The developer has 
hired New Urbanist planning firm Duany Plater-Zyberk to focus on giving the program a sense 
of place and character which will hopefully overcome current perceptions of the Tysons Corner 
area. Additionally, the master plan has given special attention to making the development as 
auto-independent and walkable as possible to reverse the impression of Tysons Corner as an 
auto-centric, congested area.8   
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Current photograph of Tysons Corner greyfield project      Rendering of proposed redevelopment at Tysons Corner 
Source: Amy Merritt            Source: www.dpz.com  
This photograph gives a sense of the current conditions that will need to be overcome to successfully market and 
develop the proposed improvements.  
 
There are a few greyfield redevelopment projects along the east coast that are 
substantially complete and perceived as very successful. Market Commons at Clarendon in 
Arlington, VA and Mizner Park in Boca Raton, FL fall into this category. Both of these 
redevelopments were filled with pedestrians when visited and were recommended as a place to 
visit either as a tourist or as a prospective resident moving to the area. It was difficult to find 
much information about any challenges that these redevelopments may have faced during their 
planning and implementation stages. Market Commons has apparently had problems with the 
user-friendliness of its structured parking and Mizner Park appeared to have over-built its 
parking decks, but otherwise, problems or shortcomings of these developments were difficult to 
uncover. Due to the complex nature of these projects, however, it is unlikely that they were 
developed without significant obstacles. Yet, each of these places has become very popular and 
has created a sense of identity for the city in which it is located.9  
To illustrate the popularity of these developments, for example, the 300 or so residential 
apartments at Market Commons in Arlington rent for $1,500 for a studio, $2,000 for a one-
bedroom, and $2,500 to over $3,000 for a two-bedroom apartment.10 The popularity of Market 
Commons as a place to live is due primarily to its substantial retail component on the first two 
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levels, including such retailers as Pottery Barn and Crate and Barrel, as well as its proximity to a 
Metro stop.11 Mizner Park is popular for its Center for the Arts, which includes a 5,000 seat 
amphitheatre, 1,800 seat concert hall and 44,000 square foot Boca Raton Museum of Art.12 This 
cultural center combined with high-end retailers and boutique restaurants make Mizner Park a 
successful entertainment and shopping destination, as well as a popular place to live.  
One aspect that differentiates these projects from the previously discussed Mashpee 
Commons and Eastgate Mall projects is that both of these projects were fully implemented as 
planned, including all mixed-use components, whereas the latter developments remain 
incomplete. This suggests that the market demand for the housing component and other uses was 
sufficient to create a positive NPV opportunity for the successful redevelopments. The strong 
market demand could be due to the location of these sites, which are in proximity to successful 
metropolitan regions. First, Market Commons is located in Arlington, VA, which is a very 
popular suburb of the rapidly growing Washington DC area and has great public transit access 
via the Metro subway line.  Mizner Park, while not located immediately adjacent to a major 
metropolis, is located within one of the six largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSA”) of 
Florida.13 Of the six MSAs in Florida, the Boca Raton–West Palm Beach MSA has experienced 
the second-highest population growth at 31% from 1990-2000.14 These successful 
redevelopment examples further support the idea that location, whether suburban or urban, may 
help create positive NPV opportunities when in proximity to a major city or metropolitan area 
that is experiencing rapid growth.  
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Market Commons at Clarendon in Arlington, VA     Mizner Park in Boca Raton, FL 
Source: Amy Merritt         Source: Amy Merritt 
Another project that has been received with great success thus far is the new Metropolitan 
Midtown redevelopment in Charlotte, NC. This greyfield site, less than 1 mile from downtown 
Charlotte, is the location of the former Midtown Mall, the first enclosed mall in Charlotte, and 
was built by The Rouse Company in the 1960s.15 The developer of the parcel, Pappas Properties, 
has initiated a lottery to pre-sell its residential condominiums due to high demand.16 The 
marketing tagline for the development is: “Life is what happens when you’re not in your car,” 
and is attempting to appeal to those weary from increasing traffic and congestion in the greater 
Charlotte area.17 Similar to the growth of the Washington DC area and Boca Raton-West Palm 
Beach MSA, the Charlotte MSA experienced a 30% increase in population growth from 1990-
2000, with continued annual population growth expected at 3.6%.18 This population growth 
should help ensure strong market demand for the project, similar to Market Commons in 
Arlington and Mizner Park in Boca Raton. 
39 
    
Renderings of Metropolitan Midtown in Charlotte, NC. The redevelopment of the former enclosed retail mall is 
currently under construction.  
Source: Metropolitan Midtown website: www.metmidtown.com 
Another similarity between Mizner Park and the apparent popularity of Metropolitan 
Midtown thus far is that both projects received substantial investment from their local 
municipalities. For example, in 1980, the city government in Boca Raton, FL created a 
community redevelopment agency (“CRA”), which designated the failed mall as a blighted area 
and established a $50 million program to upgrade the area’s infrastructure. Furthermore, once the 
plan for Mizner Park was in place, the CRA contributed an additional $68 million to the 
transaction via tax-increment financing to ensure that the project would include a cultural arts 
center.19 Metropolitan Midtown has also received funding assistance from the city of Charlotte 
and Mecklenburg County. Together, Charlotte and Mecklenburg County are spending $60 
million on improvements to the adjacent roads and greenway, which is part of a large linear 
system of parks throughout Charlotte.20 Additionally, the city and county approved $17 million 
in tax-increment financing to ensure the construction of structured parking so that the 
development could maintain its proposed high density.21  
By comparison, while the Eastgate Mall redevelopment did have public participation 
during the charrette process, the project received little support from public funding sources. Part 
of the reason this project failed to implement its housing strategy was due to insufficient parking 
areas to meet the demands of the new commercial tenants. Had the Eastgate Mall redevelopment 
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received public subsidies to assist in the construction of structured parking, it is possible that the 
master plan as originally conceived in the public charrette would have been feasible.  
 It is interesting to note that in addition to public subsidies received on some greyfield 
redevelopments, there are other greyfield redevelopment proposals that have actually been 
initiated by the local municipality itself, rather than a traditional developer or property owner. 
Both the downtown Kendall project in Florida and the greyfield mall in Richmond, VA fall into 
this category. In each case, the municipality recognized the need for redevelopment and took the 
initiative to either set up an RFP process to select a developer or, in the case of downtown 
Kendall, contract with New Urbanist planning firms to create a master plan and reform existing 
zoning regulations. This extensive public support, either through financial investment or in 
taking initiative to spur the redevelopment itself, highlights a redevelopment factor that was 
previously not considered in the basic economic model. Based on the public involvement, it is 
likely that there are externalities associated with this type of redevelopment that benefit local 
municipalities and surrounding communities. While these externalities may not be part of the 
original redevelopment equation, they are significant enough to draw public involvement and 
subsidies. 
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CHAPTER VI. BROWNFIELD AND GREYFIELD EXTERNALITIES  
Identifying the externalities of brownfields and greyfields represents another way to 
illustrate the differences in these two kinds of redevelopment. An externality exists because of 
market failure, in that the specific cost or benefit is not priced by the market and is consequently 
over or under produced. Externalities are important because they capture these external costs and 
benefits of one individual’s decision on another individual’s property value or quality of life.1 
The example of densification on an existing residential parcel is one of the most common 
situations involving externalities. For example, if a developer chooses to subdivide a single 
family lot into multiple lots or construct a mid-rise tower in place of an existing low-rise 
structure, the new units will be priced according to the current residential market. However, the 
effects of this redevelopment on the surrounding neighbors may not be priced into the sale of the 
units. Neighbors may feel that they suffer a loss of open space or that their views are obstructed, 
which could subsequently reduce their property value. This quantifiable loss in value represents a 
negative effect that is a cost to the neighbors, but is not accounted for by the private market in 
the construction and sale of the new units. Externalities such as these make the case for public 
intervention through zoning laws, height restrictions and maximum levels of density.  
Externalities can also be in the form of public goods or amenities that increase the value 
of properties located in proximity to these benefits. For example, values of identical housing 
stock or land should be priced higher for locations that offer more amenities and lower in 
locations with poor amenities.2  Examples of public amenities could be access to a local park, 
proximity to mass transit or good schools located nearby. Realizing the potential effects of 
externalities on community and property values, combined with the fact that unregulated private 
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markets tend to inadequately account for public good, creates a situation where intervention or 
involvement in redevelopment efforts at the public level makes sense.3  
Externalities of brownfields are often very clear and quantifiable, which justifies public 
intervention at federal, state and local levels when the private market does not remediate the 
problem. The potential for contamination or pollution to adversely impact the health of residents 
in an area, or perhaps spread even further to other adjacent properties is clearly a negative 
externality. Furthermore, an abandoned or underutilized brownfield site is often an eyesore in a 
community and, once redeveloped, the site can have a positive impact on the community and 
nearby property values. Without public subsidies and other forms of government assistance, 
however, the value created by the new redevelopment, V0, would be insufficient to create a 
positive NPV opportunity. Public subsidies can offset construction costs, K0, and site 
remediation costs, D0, which can enable the redevelopment project’s feasibility. The existence of 
these regulatory agencies is not a political statement, rather it shows that because the 
externalities of brownfields have been scientifically tested, quantified and proven, the existence 
of these agencies and the services they provide are warranted. If greyfield externalities were 
tested in the same way and proven to need assistance, greyfield agencies would be created as 
well. 
To address and remediate brownfield sites, federal agencies and programs have been 
established such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Superfund program of 
1980, which is the federal government’s program to clean up uncontrolled hazardous waste 
sites.4 The federal EPA provides various types of funding assistance, including cleanup grants, 
subsidized loans, and assessment grants, which are given to property owners or purchasers 
attempting to learn the extent of a site’s contamination.5 The EPA also supplies technical 
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resources, databases of brownfields projects nationwide, and legal counsel on understanding 
liability and other components of brownfields legislation.6   
In addition to federal brownfields programs, involvement at the state level is common as 
well. For example, some states have established Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs) that 
provide the state with authority over brownfield sites and set up systems to protect private parties 
who voluntarily agree to clean up contaminated sites.7 VCPs often work in conjunction with the 
EPA to coordinate remediation compliance and financial assistance.8 In Massachusetts, the 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) maintains a database of affected sites and 
licensed professionals who can assist with remediation.9 The DEP also provides financial 
assistance for cleanup efforts and ensures compliance with remediation requirements. These 
federal and state agencies promote and assist brownfield remediation and provide a structure that 
can enforce cleanup. Lastly, in addition to federal and state resources, nonprofit agencies such as 
the National Brownfield Association provide information resources, brownfields databases, and 
education and training for brownfield redevelopers.10 The proliferation of public and nonprofit 
agencies for brownfield redevelopment is largely due to the direct externalities produced by the 
contaminated sites on local communities. The negative externalities warrant the involvement of 
these agencies to ensure the sites are cleaned up for the health and betterment of the community.  
While public aid for greyfield redevelopment has been given at the local level, greyfield 
sites do not receive federal and state support in the same way that brownfield sites do. The lack 
of federal and state aid for greyfield redevelopment is due in large part to the difference in 
externalities associated with these two kinds of sites. While the contamination of brownfield sites 
produces very clear and tangible externalities in terms of health and environmental 
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consequences, the externalities of greyfield sites are more indirect and less quantifiable. Without 
any clear reason for federal or state intervention, these agencies will simply not exist. 
The most concrete negative consequence of a greyfield site is the measurable decline in 
property values of homes in close proximity to the community eyesore and the subsequent 
erosion of the municipal tax base, which is a pecuniary externality. Indirect examples of 
greyfield externalities may include increased traffic congestion and loss of rural land that occurs 
as the desire for newer, nicer suburbs are built on the suburban fringe. These effects may seem to 
be fairly unrelated, but if a greyfield site is redeveloped for a better and more intensive mix of 
uses, this may result in fewer greenfield sites being developed and produce a higher 
concentration of places to live, shop and work at interior locations. For example, a one-acre 
brownfield reclamation project saves an estimated 4.5 acres of green space.11 If this substitution 
in land consumption is true for brownfields, then some level of similar substitution would likely 
occur for greyfields as well. The higher utilization of infill locations can also reduce per capita 
gasoline consumption and related air pollution as people drive less. Governments may spend less 
due to reduced road infrastructure needs.12  Lastly, a mixed-use walkable greyfield 
redevelopment that is not dependent on the car can reduce the acreage of parking lots required, 
make public transit more efficient, and enable residents without a car to feel more independent.13 
These effects would suggest the existence of positive externalities of greyfield redevelopment 
that are not priced into the new asset itself.  If these benefits could be quantifiably measured and 
proven, similar to brownfield externalities, then a certain level of public subsidies and other 
involvement at the federal and state levels could be warranted.  
 The involvement of local governments in greyfield redevelopment proves, at least in part, 
the existence of greyfield externalities. For example, as mentioned previously, the Boca Raton 
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CRA contributed $118 million towards the redevelopment of the failed Boca Raton Mall into 
Mizner Park.14 After its completion in 1996, Mizner Park quickly became a major shopping, arts 
and entertainment destination for residents and tourists alike, and is now referred to as “the 
downtown” of Boca Raton.15 These benefits of increased identity and sense of place, while 
somewhat intangible, are representative of positive externalities that can be created for a 
community through redevelopment. Additionally, by 2001, single family homes in the adjacent 
area, which had sold below the county average in the early 1990s, were selling for 10% above 
the county average.16 Furthermore, in the same year, approximately 1.7 million square feet of 
new real estate was under construction within the Boca Raton CRA district surrounding Mizner 
Park. 17 The price appreciation of surrounding homes and increased jobs and municipal tax base 
created by the new development are significant and quantifiable externalities of the 
redevelopment. 
 In spite of these benefits of greyfield redevelopment, however, it is the difference 
between greyfield and brownfield externalities that partially explains why brownfield 
redevelopment is occurring so much more frequently than greyfield redevelopment. Public 
assistance and subsidized funding help make these redevelopment projects more feasible and 
successful. However, because the externalities of greyfield redevelopment have perhaps not been 
measured and are less tangible than those of brownfields, federal and state support is not 
warranted in greyfield redevelopment. Brownfield contamination is scientifically provable, 
whereas the effects of a greyfield site are more subjective. Without a clear measurement of the 
direct externalities of a greyfield site and a way to concretely designate a site as a greyfield, it is 
difficult to justify a need for public support at federal and state levels.  
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Without public support at federal and state levels, greyfield redevelopment will vary 
greatly from one locale to another, depending on the cooperation and assistance provided at the 
local level. The direct and clear externalities of brownfields have enabled the creation of public 
agencies that offer significant support through funding and other resources. This availability of 
public support has in turn fostered the growth of an industry around brownfields and 
development of various brownfield specialists. Greyfields are still largely one-off deals and must 
obtain public support on a local and individual basis. For greyfield redevelopment to really gain 
traction, it may need support at federal and state levels to subsequently create the need and 
opportunity for a specialized industry around greyfields. Gaining support at the local level, while 
helpful for individual transactions, is too fragmented to create a comprehensive industry of scale 
that would be able to provide specialization, support and ultimately create a greyfield industry.  
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CHAPTER VII. OPPORTUNITIES IN GREYFIELD REDEVELOPMENT  
Based on the redevelopment model analyzed and greyfield redevelopments visited, there 
would seem to be investment opportunity to identify and redevelop appropriate greyfield sites. 
However, as indicated in the previous section, without public support, these greyfield 
transactions are unlikely to be positive NPV opportunities. While subsidies and support at the 
local level may be sufficient to create individual redevelopment opportunities, the fragmented 
and unique nature of each transaction would not encourage repeat development nor foster the 
creation of broader industry specialists. Similar to the increasingly successful brownfield 
industry of the last few decades, greyfields may need support at the federal and state levels to 
achieve similar levels of frequency and industry specialization.  
At the moment, there is no likely federal agency to sponsor greyfield redevelopment, due 
in part to the somewhat unclear and indirect nature of the sites’ externalities. In lieu of 
establishing greyfield-specific federal and state agencies, however, perhaps some of the existing 
agencies that support brownfield remediation could begin to include greyfield sites as well. 
While the EPA’s definition of brownfields very specifically requires the presence of pollution or 
contamination to receive brownfield status, some states’ definitions are more general.1 
Specifically, some states define brownfields as “abandoned, idled and/or underused real property 
– typically industrial or commercial.”2 This definition would certainly include many greyfield 
sites. By availing greyfield sites of the assistance for which brownfields are currently eligible 
and thereby possibly reducing K0 or D0, the number of positive NPV redevelopment 
opportunities for greyfields would increase. Additionally, having a consistent support structure at 
the state level would enable developers to create a replicable redevelopment model in that state, 
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rather than having to tailor each project to the preferences and systems of the local government 
within the state. 
In general, justifying the need for public intervention in greyfield redevelopment would 
not seem to be the most difficult challenge as several successful greyfield examples have already 
secured local assistance and the positive effects of these redevelopments can be measured by the 
municipality and proven to other cities. The more difficult aspect of trying to make public 
assistance available to greyfield sites, particularly at the state or federal level, would seem to be 
articulating an objective definition that would clearly capture the universe of greyfields. The 
designation of brownfields according to the EPA’s definition is largely indisputable in that 
contamination is either present or not. Greyfields, however, are not so scientifically measured 
and defined. Physical characteristics of a greyfield, such as a range of parcel sizes and ratio of 
building footprints to acres of parking lots, could be specified, but determining what constitutes 
an “underperforming” or “underutilized” site is less precise. Measures such as vacancy, sales per 
square foot, and average credit rating of tenant composition may be used, but devising a concrete 
set of criteria with these metrics that would capture most greyfield sites could be difficult. Also, 
it is possible that owners of failing commercial parcels may be resistant to this type of 
designation if they are not convinced of the declining status of the site. One solution may be that 
if greyfield funding sources were established at state or federal levels, the administering of these 
funds could simply be reviewed on a case by case basis, by which a developer or property owner 
would apply to the appropriate public agency to receive greyfield status. This subjectively-given 
status would then make the site eligible for the various resources and financial assistance of the 
agency. Of course, a major drawback to this type of process is that the administration could be 
quite burdensome for the agency.  
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 Shifting from public level assistance, there may be opportunity to foster increased 
redevelopment of greyfield sites through private efforts. One such means is the creation of a 
greyfield investment fund, similar in structure to the brownfield remediation fund, Cherokee 
Investment Partners. Cherokee Investment Partners (“Cherokee”), founded in 1993, purchases 
brownfield sites, performs the cleanup and remediation and then repositions the property for 
reuse.3 Cherokee has raised three institutional funds, with Fund III raising $620 million in 
private equity capital.4 While Cherokee has an explicit sustainability focus and environmental 
mission, the investors in Fund III are the same endowments, pension funds and institutions that 
invest in traditional venture capital and private equity funds.5 Furthermore, contrary to the 
previous section whereby public support and subsidies were described as helpful, if not essential, 
in achieving positive NPV status, Cherokee’s brownfield remediation projects have used little 
public financing because the public grants available are so small in comparison to the total cost 
of the cleanup.6 Cherokee’s private equity fund model suggests that if brownfield remediation 
can be achieved profitably at the private level on an international scale with little public 
financing, the opportunity may exist for a greyfield fund to do the same thing.  
 Considering Cherokee as a model for a greyfield fund, the lack of public funding used 
and the appeal to a traditional investor base is promising, in that there is not anything particularly 
unique about Cherokee’s investors or financing strategy that would not then translate to a 
greyfield fund. Perhaps the least clear area in which a greyfield fund would be able to replicate 
the Cherokee model is in value creation. In Cherokee’s case, previously unusable land has been 
cleaned up by the company with a successful track record, creating tangible value with which to 
justify an increase in price from its original basis. Similarly, a greyfield fund would need to 
articulate its value creation strategy. This strategy would need to be focused enough that many of 
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the same processes could be repeated for each property in the fund. For example, while every 
property is unique, almost all greyfield sites have a variety of complicated lease structures that 
would need to be bought out or terminated somehow. Additionally, existing structures on the 
parcel may be outdated but reusable, so having a team able to identify structures suitable for 
reuse versus structures needing to be demolished would be helpful. Other similarities would 
likely occur across greyfield sites, but unlike brownfields, preparing a greyfield site for reuse is 
less scientific. Thus, to really replicate Cherokee’s model, the question of articulating how a 
greyfield fund really adds value to each parcel that, in turn, justifies an increase in land price to a 
potential purchaser would need to be answered. Articulating value creation is essential for two 
reasons: (1) creating a repeatable process for the fund that can be applied across all investment 
properties, and (2) helping investors understand the fund’s strategy. Investors will need to make 
investment decisions based on the quantifiable process whereby the fund adds value to a 
greyfield site. 
 In addition to defining value creation, the greyfield fund may have difficulty in sourcing 
deals. While there are federal, state and local databases of brownfield sites, greyfield sites are not 
catalogued in any central database. These locations are identifiable primarily at the local level 
only, which could be quite time-consuming for a fund and make the efficient deployment of 
investment capital difficult. Additionally, creating a portfolio with enough properties to achieve 
an appropriate level of diversification will require a fairly substantial amount of capital. To 
deploy this substantial amount of capital, the fund’s focus will likely need to be regional or even 
national in focus to have enough greyfield sites from which to choose and invest. Identifying 
greyfield sites on this broad geographic scope would be complicated given the lack of 
information and resources at state or federal levels. One factor that may somewhat offset this 
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difficulty, however, could be that simply creating a greyfield fund establishes a brand that will 
attract greyfield deal flow.  The initial start up period may be challenging though as many 
institutional investors like to have a sense of the future properties of a portfolio before investing. 
Generating enough greyfield deal flow while simultaneously trying to raise capital and create a 
greyfield brand would be a complicated endeavor.  
 If these challenges of deal flow and value creation could be solved, there are several 
reasons why a greyfield-focused private equity fund could be helpful in increasing the frequency 
of greyfield redevelopments. First, the well-capitalized fund could partner with local developers 
and provide much-needed access to capital for these typically large and complicated mixed-use 
redevelopments. Second, over time, the fund would develop expertise in specific greyfield 
redevelopment aspects, such as securing local public financing to subsidize parking 
infrastructure or working with communities to approve high density redevelopment proposals. 
Third, the timeline of a private equity fund of this nature would likely be 10 years or more, 
especially if the fund were to be directly involved in the redevelopment.  Having a fund’s whose 
interests are aligned with long-term objectives is ideal for a site needing redevelopment and 
transformation. Since many greyfield sites have had a relatively short shelf-life of a few decades 
from when they were first constructed, having a fund whose goal is not the “build and flip” 
model could be preferable for ensuring long-term success.7 Furthermore, mixed-use 
developments tend to weather individual real estate product market cycles better than a single 
use development as they are not totally dependent on the performance of one product type for 
profitability. Thus, an investor whose interests are aligned with the project’s long-term success is 
preferable to a traditional developer whose goal is to construct the product type as quickly as 
possible and resell to the highest bidder. A long-term fund structure may abate this misalignment 
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of interests and ensure that places are built with a greater likelihood of long-term success and 
less chance of becoming a greyfield in a few decades.  
Based on the relatively young age of the greyfield redevelopment field, it would not seem 
that the timing is ideal to start a greyfield fund now. Yet, as awareness and education about 
greyfield sites and the benefits of redevelopment increase in both public and private institutions, 
the possibility of a successful fund implementation may become more likely. Due to the long 
timeline of development projects, however, it may take several years, even decades, for this level 
of awareness to reach a broad enough scope of people and institutions to create a true greyfield 
industry in which a greyfield fund could succeed. 
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CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
While the greyfield industry is relatively small in comparison to brownfields, it does 
seem to be growing in interest and popularity. As the industry grows and matures, it will become 
evident when the creation of public agencies at federal and state levels is warranted or the when 
the timing is right for implementation of a greyfield fund. In the meantime, however, there are 
several steps that could be taken that will foster growth and understanding of the field.  
First, one of the most helpful aspects to encourage greyfield redevelopment will be to 
quantify empirically the potential benefits and externalities of this redevelopment. Using 
examples of successful implementation such as Mizner Park and Market Commons at Clarendon, 
the benefits of saved open space, reduced car usage, gas consumption, air pollution and 
congestion should be studied. Additionally, positive effects on the surrounding community 
including increased property values and municipal tax base should be quantified as well.  
Fully understanding the benefits created by greyfield redevelopments can serve several 
purposes. First, it will warrant the increased involvement of federal and state governments, in the 
form of resources and financial subsidies. Second, on a more intangible basis, just as brownfield 
remediation is appreciated by socially and environmentally conscious people for its health 
benefits, society will appreciate greyfields in the same way if the benefits of greyfield 
redevelopment in mitigating the effects of sprawl can be demonstrated. The idea behind this 
form of education and social awareness about the benefits of greyfield redevelopment is not the 
typical sprawl bashing that some “anti-growthers” espouse, but is rather about supporting the 
idea of creating choice for those who may prefer a different lifestyle, especially in suburban 
areas. While everyone may not want to live in high density urban centers, there may be many 
families who would prefer a small townhouse in a mixed-use greyfield redevelopment rather 
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than a typical detached single family suburban home, if the tradeoffs of a shorter commute and 
less time in the car, for example, were offered by this lifestyle. 
As society begins to value benefits from mixed-use greyfield redevelopment such as 
walkability, decreased car-usage, reduced gas consumption and congestion, this shift in 
preferences will add value to redevelopment projects in a quantifiable way. People may even 
begin to place value on potential long-term health benefits of an active lifestyle fostered by 
walkability and access to other uses. There is some evidence that this is occurring, even in 
traditionally auto-centric parts of the southeast. For example, Post Apartments, a historically 
garden-style suburban apartment developer, has recently advertised ground-floor retail as one of 
the primary amenities in its new apartment building in Charlotte, NC.1 This demonstrates that 
some suburban markets are responding to mixed-use development and capturing value from its 
benefits. The pricing of these benefits through increased rents and sales prices in newly 
redeveloped assets will potentially create more positive NPV redevelopment opportunities as V0 
increases. 
The societal change in preferences and creating lifestyle choice in suburban areas relates 
to identifying positive NPV opportunities through greyfield site selection. Strong, growing 
metropolitan areas that are feeling the strains of traffic on quality of life and household and 
municipal transportation costs will be ideal areas in which to find greyfield sites for 
redevelopment. Both the local municipality and the market will likely be receptive to greyfield 
redevelopment if its benefits and externalities have been proven.  
Increasing the frequency of greyfield redevelopment is not a linear process, and will 
require multiple steps and involve various parties including local residents, developers and 
government institutions. Social education and a shift in consumer preferences, combined with 
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quantified and scientifically proven benefits of greyfield redevelopment will be integral in 
creating a strong market for these projects. Even the recent increase in gasoline prices helps 
foster receptivity to these changes. Once the demand has increased in the market and appropriate 
levels of intervention from government agencies have been determined, the greyfield industry 
will gain a level of scale in which a private greyfield fund could be successful.  
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